A Photograph
Once during a trip to Queens, a Yolmo-Nepali man who I will call Mingmar shared a small, wallet-sized photograph of himself with his wife and young son. to phenomenology is the Husserlian concept of "phenomenological modification," the way in which "social actors come to take on differing attitudes that evidence more or less reflective or engaged stances when relating to objects of experience, be those objects deemed to be of the mind or of the world." (Desjarlais and Throop 2011: 88) Through a "bracketing" of the "natural attitude," a social actor works to suspend her prior taken for granted assumptions about the nature of reality, in order to get to the essence of the object in question. (Husserl 1983; Desjarlais and Throop 2011) As Alesandro Duranti has noted, 5
Husserl's notion of the "natural attitude" is similar to what anthropologists understand as the cultural constitution of reality. (Duranti 2010) 2 Within anthropology the use of a phenomenological approach has often entailed a focus on "life as lived" as opposed to more theoretically driven analyses. (Deslarlais and Throop 2011; Jackson 1996 Jackson , 2012 Importantly, Robert Desjarlais has called for what he terms a "critical phenomenology," which in many ways lays out the phenomenological approach that I have been most inspired by. He writes,
A critical phenomenology…can help us not only to describe what people feel, think, or experience but also to grasp how the processes of feeling or experiencing come about through multiple, interlocking interactions. Such an approach is phenomenological because it would entail a close, unassuming study of 'phenomena,' of 'things themselves' -how, for instance, people tend to feel in a certain cultural situation. But the approach is also critical in that it tried to go beyond phenomenological description to understand why things are this way: to inquire, for instance, into what we mean by feeling, how it comes about, what it implies, and what broader cultural and political forces are involved. In addition, the phenomenology is a critical one because it tries to take into account the makings of its own perceptions. (Desjarlais 1997: 25) Or, as Michael Jackson has recently put it, Rather than speak of stable and identifiable entities-whether these be personalities, innate dispositions, cultures, religions, or historical periodswe prefer to deconstruct such categories, exploring the mutable and multifarious character of our actual being-in-the-world, and suspending all assumptions as to the epistemological truth of the descriptive labels we deploy in creating the illusions that the world can be subject to our knowledge and control. Our focus is the human struggle for being-the ongoing, resourceful, and various ways in which we work, alone and together, to affirm life in the face of death, salvage life in the face of adversity, and make life fulfilling rather than empty of meaning. (Jackson 2012: 173) 6
For me, to engage in a phenomenology of migration is to focus on the everyday lived experience of Yolmo migrants as they strive to live their lives in the midst of separation and uncertainty, as social life and family relations are driven into new formations. Such an approach is concerned with "what is at stake" (Kleinman and Kleinman 1991:227) for a particular person in particular times and places.
Migration creates a distinct existential register that is liminal in nature. In the case of Yolmo-Nepali migrants, culturally informed understandings of time, space, and liminality (the bardo) shape intensities of waiting, isolation, longing, absence, "lostness,"
and familial and personal reintegration. Victor Turner (and Arnold VanGennep before him), discussed liminality in the context of rites of passage. For Turner, the experience of liminality is necessarily bound on either side by a dialectical oppositions of past and future, high and low, structure and anti-structure. The liminal phase is a dangerous passage filled with energy, creative power, and potential, and marked by ambiguity, and uncertainty. (Turner 1969) The latin root of the word limen means threshold, indexing the realm of the in-between. In the context of Yolmo Buddhists, the concept of the bardo is a culturally shared understanding of the between.
In Tibetan, the word bardo means "between two," and it is used to describe any intermediate period-the moments between sleep and waking, the time between death and rebirth, or even a pause between words. Although used across a number of contexts, the bardo between death and rebirth is the archetypal meaning of bardo for Yolmo
Buddhists. Described as a time of powerfully disorientating sensations, uncertainty, ambiguity and suspense, the bardo is a space filled with "nightmarish images." As Buddhist teacher Sogyol Rinpoche writes, the bardo "creates gaps, spaces in which profound chances and opportunities for transformation are continuously flowering." (Rinpoche 1993:105) It is during the bardo between death and rebirth that enlightenment is possible. Many Yolmo migrants I have spoken with have talked about migration as being a kind of bardo. By considering migration as an experience of profound liminality, and attending to such imaginative processes as dreaming, desire, hope, and the relationship between the real and the virtual which take form during this "in-between," I aim to illuminate some of the fundamental existential and affective aspects of migration that often resist articulation or go unspoken, yet shape everyday lived experience.
The etymology of the verb, "to imagine," can be traced from the Latin imaginari, which means, "to form a mental picture to oneself," as well as imago, which is "to copy or picture." (OED 2012) Contemporary conceptualizations of the imagination are numerous, making reference to the ability to form mental images, ideas, objects, and situations in the mind; the contemplation of future potentialities; fanciful thinking, which is detached from reality; or, inspired from the Romantics, taken as a synonym for creativity, inventiveness, and artistic brilliance. (OED 2012)
Toward and Anthropology of the Imagination
From an anthropological perspective, the imagination has been conceived of in numerous ways. In what follows, I will outline what I see as four approaches towards the anthropology of the imagination which I have defined as the following: 1) the social imaginary, 2) the imagination as ethnographic object, 3) the anthropology of dreams, and 8 4) existential and phenomenological engagements with the imagination. What I have parsed into these groups is by no means an exhaustive list, although it serves to give a sense of the diverse ways anthropologists talk about and understand the imagination.
The Social Imaginary
Within the larger sphere of sociocultural anthropology, the notion of "the imaginary" is perhaps best known from the work of Benedict Anderson (1983) , Charles Taylor (2002) , and Arjun Appadurai (1996) among others. 3 Such studies stress the importance of the imagination for the construction of national and political identities, the ways in which ordinary people imagine belonging to a certain community, and the impact of globalization on the social practice of the imagination.
In his widely regarded essay, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural
Economy," Appadurai argues that:
The world we live in today is characterized by a new role for the imagination in social life. To grasp this new role, we need to bring together: the old idea of images, especially mechanically produced images (in the Frankfurt School sense); the idea of the imagined community (in Anderson's sense); and the French idea of the imaginary (imaginaire), as a constructed landscape of collective aspirations…the image, the imagined, the imaginary, -these are all terms which direct us to something critical and new in global cultural processes: the imagination as a social practice. (Appadurai 1996: 4) Through his framework of global cultural flows (ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and ideoscapes), Appadurai thinks through the ways in which new "imagined worlds" have come into being. Through an examination of media and migration, it is possible to explore "their joint effect on the work of the imagination as a 9 constitutive feature of modern subjectivity…Such media transforms the field of mass mediation because they offer new resources and new disciplines for the construction of imagined selves and imagined worlds." (Appadurai 1996: 3) For Appadurai, the imagination, as a collective, social phenomenon, inspires migration and social change, and shapes conceptions of self.
In his book, Modern Social Imaginaries, Charles Taylor, drawing on Anderson, defines his take on the social imaginary. He writes, By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. (Taylor 2004: 23) For Taylor, the social imaginary is tied up with social practices and the development of a "modern moral order." This new conception of morality was able to come into being through a specifically modern social imaginary, in which people began to imagine new ways of relating to each other, new social expectations, and ultimately a new kind of social existence. (Taylor 2004: 23) 4 In accord with such insights, the imaginative forces present in the lives of migrants are both individual and social in nature. Such forces take the form of dreams and daydreams, as well as a more mythic form, the social imaginary of the "American Matter (2011) , take the imagination as a central object of study. In doing so these works stand apart from discussion of the imagination in the context of dreams or the "social imaginary". All three anthropologists work among Sufi groups in North Africa, where there is a strong cultural idiom surrounding dreams and understandings of the imagination. Additionally, these three texts are the only book-length works in anthropology to date that explicitly take on the imagination as an object of study. As such they serve as foundational contributions in defining the anthropology of the imagination.
In Pandolfo's Impasse of the Angels, she reads subjectivity, history, and the Mittermaier defines her take on the imagination in the following way:
By the terms imaginary and imagination I refer not to the made-up or to fantasy, but to a broader range of meanings that encompass a variety of spaces, modes of perception, and conceptualizations of the real…an understanding of the imagination that is not anchored in the individual subject but instead refers to an intermediary realm between the spiritual and the material, the Divine and the human, the dreamer and multiple Others, presence and absence. My concern is with the role of what lies beyond the horizon, with the possibilities it offers us, with the licit and illicit desires it triggers, the plays of power it suggests, the dread it can cause-the uncertainty, the sense of contingency, of chance-the exaltation, the thrill of the unknown, it can provoke. Imagined, dreamt, projected, calculated, prophesied, so constructed, the beyond always turns on our take on it. (Crapanzano 2004:14) Mining ethnographic examples of imaginative processes from a wide range of authors, Crapanzano examines how people imagine and limit possibilities that arise in different genres of experience: the body, pain, trauma and transgression; hope and remembrance; death and the afterlife. Throughout the work as a whole there is a consistent striving to illuminate the ways in which people understand the unknown, paying particular attention to gaps and absences, and that which often resists articulation in the flow of experience. "My concern is with openness and closure," Crapanzano to "call attention to that dimension of experience that insofar as it resists articulation, indeed disappears with articulation, has in fact been ignored." (Crapanzano 2004: 18) Additionally, Crapanzano attends to the imagination in relation to hope and such associated experiences as "dreams, waking dreams, daydreams…illusion; anticipation, expectation, and possibility; the future; patience and waiting; doubt, fear and joy; revolution, utopia, and apocalypse…salvation, redemption, and…expiation…realism and At best, such thoughts enable a kind of escape 7 Husserl defines "horizon of indeterminacy" as that which one knows is there, even though it may not be fully visually available. For example, when looking at a book resting face up on a table, one knows that there are pages with words printed inside, that there is a back cover etc. even though those aspects of the book are not visible from one's particular stance at that moment. For Sartre, "imaged" objects are impoverished in this sense. See Husserl (1983) and Sartre (2004) .
from oppressive conditions; "the evasion which they invite us is not only that which would make us flee our current condition, our concerns, our boredoms; they offer us an escape from all the constraints of the world, they seem to be presented as a negation of the condition of being in the world, as an anti-world." ( Christians, he points out a variety of types of sensory imaginings, which not only take the form of mental images (although these are the most commonly experienced), but also occur as auditory, olfactory, haptic, kinesthetic, affective and motor imaginings. Such imaginative experiences are embodied in the habitus of Charismatics. As Csordas writes, we must, Grasp both the aptness and the persuasiveness of imagination as a process of the sacred self, a process that impresses itself on Charismatics precisely because it often appears 'out of the blue.' It is at once profoundly of the self, but at the same time is experienced as profoundly other, in a way ripe for thematization as the sacred Other acting within the self. If, as we have argued, the body is the ground of self as a 'setting in relation to the world,' it is also critical that we have described this imaginal self process in terms of embodied imagery. The cultural elaboration of imagery is an engagement of the entire sensorium, and hence a concrete articulation of what Merleau-Ponty (1962) called the 'bodily synthesis.' (Csordas 1997: 94) In order to investigate the differences between ordinary and religious forms of imagining, Csordas draws on the work of philosopher Edward Casey whose book,
Imagining: A Phenomenological Study, remains an important contribution to phenomenological studies of the imagination to date. Here Casey seeks "to pin down [the imagination's] structures and to discern the differences that distinguish it from other forms of experience." (1976: xvii) Through thought experiments Casey identifies three sets of traits that define the structure of the imagination: 1) spontaneity and controlledness-by this he means that images arise spontaneously in the mind and can be controlled at any point, 2) self-containedness and self-evidence-the content of the images are self-contained and do not refer to other experiences and as such are self-evident, and
3) indeterminacy and pure possibility-imaginings lack any specifiable form or content, they are indeterminate, and everything that is imagined is posited as purely possible. In
The Sacred Self, Csordas draws multiple connections between Casey's structure of the imagination and the imagination as it exists in the world of Charismatics.
Casey's emphasis on "pure possibility" as a critical part of the structure of the imagination also echoes Crapanzano, Mittermaier, and Parish's understanding that possibilities for imagining are tied up with culturally informed practices, or as Csordas 21 puts it, "if the imagination as a generalized capacity of self, or characteristic somatic mode of attention, becomes part of the habitus generated among Charismatics, it is without doubt part of the same habitus that includes those generalized dispositions that make up the repertoire of interpretants for revelatory imagery." (Csordas 1997: 107) In his ethnography, Wisdom Sits in Places, Keith Basso also draws on Casey as he links the act of imagining with the act of remembering to explore possible modes of imagining and relating to place among the Western Apache. In the context of Apache culture "images evoked by place-names cause them to travel in their minds." (1996: 89) He writes, A modest body of evidence suggests that place-making involves multiple acts of remembering and imagining which inform each other in complex ways…it is clear, however, that remembering often provides a basis for imagining. What is remembered about a particular place-including, prominently, verbal and visual accounts of what has transpired thereguides and constrains how it will be imagined by delimiting a field of workable possibilities. These possibilities are then exploited by acts of conjecture and speculation which build upon them and go beyond them to create possibilities of a new and original sort, thus producing a fresh and expanded picture of how things might have been. (Basso 1996: 5) While the imagination is not Basso's object of interest per se, this mental process plays a critical role in the practice of speaking with names, which is central to the Western Apache's way of being in the world. Through his research Basso points out that "an effective narrator, people from Ciecuew report, never speaks too much; an effective Consultants from Cibecue explain that in positioning people's minds to look "forward" in space, a place-name also positions their minds to look "backward" into time. For as persons imagine themselves standing in front of a named site, they may imagine that they are standing in their "ancestors' tracks," and from this psychological perspective, which is sometimes described as an intense form of "daydreaming," traditional accounts of ancestral events associated with the site are said to be recalled with singular clarity. (Basso 1996: 89) In the case of the Western Apache, Basso points to culturally informed modes of daydreaming that are connected to understandings of place and time. Such cultural variation in both the practice and experience of daydreaming indicates the potential far rich anthropological analysis.
In contrast to Basso, in his article "Daydreaming, intimacy, and the intersubjective third in fieldwork encounters in Syria," (2011) experience through one's own. Throop argues that not only is it through moments of understanding that knowledge of another is produced, but also moments of misunderstanding that we come to know "previously concealed aspects of our own or 26 another's being" (2010: 781) In this way, although one may never fully understand another's experience, we may be able to come closer by thoughtfully attending to the occilations between moments of understanding and misunderstanding.
Perhaps it is only in the intersubjective space between insight and oblivion that we can grasp the experience of another. From this perspective it seems impossible to understand another's experience without some form of empathy, some "type of reasoning in which a person emotionally resonates with the experience of another while simultaneously attempting to imaginatively view a situation from that other person's perspective." (Hollan and Throop 2011) It seems that we must necessarily draw on our own life experiences, and through analogy and imagination come to some sort of understanding with and of others. and the virtual provide critical insights that help to explain the potency of Mingmar's photograph. Virtuality is distinguished by its quality of potentiality; it is fundamentally generative in nature. The virtual is not opposed to reality, but instead, actuality, as the virtual also has the ability to create real effects, despite its immateriality. 9 In Becoming Virtual, Pierre Lévy writes that "the virtual tends toward actualization…The tree is virtually present in the seed. " (Lévy 1998: 23) In this example, the virtual presence of the tree in the seed is the potential for the seed to become actualized in the world, to Moods emerge from imaginative experience and take form as ethnographically meaningful material. Heidegger's discussion of moods points to this in as much as he writes that, "mood makes manifest 'how one is and is coming along'." (Heidegger (1953 (Heidegger ( ) 2010 131) Yet the source of such moods may not always be clear; "mood assails. It comes neither from 'without' nor from 'within,' but rises from being-in-the-world as a mode of that being." (Heidegger (1953) (Heidegger (1953 (Heidegger ( ) 2010 As ephemeral moments of being, "moods entail residues of past experience and subjunctive possibilities for future transformation…being in a mood is being-between, being-in-transition, being-in-motion." (Throop forthcoming) Kunsang, a middle aged Yolmo-Nepali man, also migrated to New York in hopes of making a new life for his family and providing his children with better opportunities.
While doing fieldwork during the Summer of 2012, he spoke to me of a recurring dream that would come to him during the difficult and uncertain three and a half years he waited for his family to join him in the U.S. This is an emotionally charged, repeating dream; it necessitates a phone call home to his family in Nepal. The phone call is the tangible form of a kind of "dream residue" as Hollan has put it, in which dream content can be seen to shape waking life. (Hollan 2003) Kunsang argues that such a response is not unique to his experience, and he has said, "I think any Yolmo would agree, if there was any dream coming like that they would just right away call home, check with their families. Because it's rooted in them now, because it has so much meaning." Such dreaming is social in nature, and many dreams and For three and a half years Kunsang was separated from his family in Kathmandu, Nepal, waiting for the U.S. government to approve visas for them to join him.
Attachment to and separation from loved ones are tied up with complex moral and ethical commitments that people struggle with as they make the choice to leave behind budding careers and ancestral communities to start again in a foreign country. For Kunsang, it was powerful feelings of paternal responsibility for his young daughters' future intertwined with fears of blame and failure, which he sees as motivating his decision to come to the United States and endure three years of separation. Such choices are not made easily.
Migrating to the United States meant relinquishing his high paying executive position in 35 a carpet design firm to work at a much lower level job in the United States; it also meant the possibility that his young infant daughter Uten might have no memory of him. In dreams and thoughts of possible futures, moral struggles regarding incompatible responsibilities towards one's self, family, and community crystalize in everyday acts of the imagination.
Imagining himself through his daughter's eyes, Kunsang envisioned a possible future and a possible self he did not want to become. Such existential imaginings, perhaps out of fear, ultimately gave him strength to stay in the United States, to "keep going"
even in the midst of unbearable separation. On the humid August Sunday that this interview took place, Kunsang's young daughter Uten played around us, singing to herself quietly as we spoke. Kunsang's wife and daughters were finally able to secure visas to join him in New York, and the family is now united.
Conclusion
In this essay I have juxtaposed dreams with more subtle forms of daydreaming and reverie states. Such experiences are rarely made an object of study, perhaps due to their fleeting, ephemeral nature. Yet just as dreams leave their mark on waking life, so do our daydreams and reveries leak into our shared social realities. As Crapanzano has written in his essay "The Scene: Shadowing the real," epiphenomena such as fleeting moods and feelings are "a significant and effective dimension of the world in which we live, think, and act." (2006: 389) Edmund Husserl's phenomenological understanding of intentionalty further supports this idea. (Husserl 1983 ; Duranti forthcoming) For Husserl, reality is constituted through intentional acts, by which we "objectivate" (constitute) 36 objects around us and imbue these objects with meaning. Such a structure of intentionality makes possible a multiplicity of orientations towards any single object.
Meaning is created in the world through these acts of intentionality, through our engagement with the world, regardless of whether that world is real or imaginary. Husserl writes,
The ray of the pure Ego's regard sometimes goes through one noetic stratum 10 and sometimes through another…sometimes straightforwardly, sometimes reflectively. Within the given total field of potential noeses and correlative objects of noeses we sometimes look at a whole, the tree, perhaps, which is perceptually present, sometimes as these or those parts a moments of it; then, again, we look at a nearby physical thing or at a complex content and process. Suddenly we turn our regard to an object of memory which 'comes to mind.' Instead of going through the perceptual noesis, which, in a continuously unitary though highly articulated manner, constitutes for us the continually appearing world of physical things, the regard goes through a remembering noesis into a world of memory; it wanders about in this world, passes over into memories or other degrees or into worlds of phantasy, and so forth. (1983: 223) I have tried to follow "the ray of the pure Ego's regard" as it wanders through the perceptual present, past memories, or perhaps into imaginary worlds, ultimately relating to a particular object in time and space. In my work with Yolmo-Nepali migrants I have tried to attend to the ways in which the overlaying of multiple modes of regard, such as remembering and imagining, shape everyday experiences of the present moment.
Although initially I argued that migration creates a specific existential register that generates certain kinds of imagining, I am no longer sure that the dreams, daydreams and photographs I describe here are unique to migration. Instead I believe they point to something much larger, 10 Husserl defines the structure of intentionality through noesis and noema. Noema is roughly defined as "sense"; each intentional act has it's own corresponding noema-"perception…has it's noema, most basically it's perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived…remembering has its remembered as remembered…judging has its judged as judged." (Husserl 1983: 214) The noematic (sense) correlate is immanent to the mental process of any intentional act.
something that is part of a shared human experience, a way of responding to absence and separation, as well as more generally, a way of mediating between the world as one would like it to be and the world as it is. (Jackson 2007 (Jackson , 2012 In this regard, I believe that the dreams and daydreams I have discussed here stand as examples of the way that the universal can exist within the singular; the general in the particular. (Throop 2010; Jackson 2012) I have also tried to trace ordinary affects, to use Kathleen Stewart's term, as they stream through dreams, daydreams, and other imaginings of Yolmo people like Kunsang and Mingmar, as they live their everyday lives in New York City, arising in the movement of a stride while walking down a busy street in Queens, or during a long subway commute. Mingmar's daydreams on the 7 train stretch back to memories of his village, his childhood, of New Year's blessings from the elders in his community; these thoughts, in turn, build intensities of feeling-desire to be in the village, nostalgia for the past, frustration for the present in which returning to Nepal is impossible. The experience of the present moment encompasses memories of the past as well as imaginings of possible futures. As dreaming and daydreaming impinge on waking life, subjectivity is textured by and perhaps even created through imaginative processes. There is still much work to be done to map the connections between dreams, daydreams, and reverie, and the palpable ways in which such forms of imagining enable us to "keep going," as we struggle to balance our conditions of existence in which we find ourselves simultaneously thrown into the world and constrained by conditions beyond our control, yet able to dream, imagine, and craft the future as we wish it to be.
